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Too Plain to be Misunderstood: Sovereign 
Immunity Under the Arkansas Constitution1
The framers of the constitution certainly knew that 
instances of hardship would result from the prohibition 
of suits against the State, but they nevertheless elected 
to write that immunity into the constitution. The 
language is too plain to be misunderstood, and it is our 
duty to give effect to it.2 
Given the fluid nature of the law, time is often the greatest 
enemy of clarity in court precedent.  From law students to 
experienced judges, anyone who has tried to research the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity under the Arkansas Constitution has 
surely struggled with that enemy as they sift through the years of 
convoluted and inconsistent cases interpreting the scope of the 
State’s protection from suit.  This comment attempts to abate the 
Arkansas lawyer’s burden in understanding the language that is 
ostensibly impossible to misunderstand. 
I. FOUNDATIONS OF THE STATE’S IMMUNITY
An historically powerful staple of the common law, the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity once provided state and federal 
governments and their employees nearly universal protection 
from judicial proceedings.3  However, following the passage of 
the Federal Tort Claims Act4 in 1946, states began to gravitate 
1. University of Arkansas School of Law J.D. Candidate ‘19.  The author would like
to thank Howard W. Brill, Vincent Foster Professor of Legal Ethics & Professional 
Responsibility and former Chief Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court, without whose 
experience, wisdom, and guidance this comment would not have been possible. 
2. Bryant v. Ark. State Highway Comm’n, 233 Ark. 41, 44, 342 S.W.2d 415, 417 
(1961). 
3. State Sovereign Immunity and Tort Liability, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES [hereinafter NCSL], http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/state-
sovereign-immunity-and-tort-liability.aspx [https://perma.cc/3HNZ-6BMX] (last updated 
Sept. 8, 2010). 
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2012).
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toward more governmental accountability and away from 
immunization.5  This nationwide trend toward more government 
liability can largely be seen as an effort to alleviate the historical 
harshness of the doctrine of sovereign immunity,6 which slams 
the doors of the courthouse shut on many plaintiffs with 
legitimate claims. 
Today, most states deal with governmental liability by 
statute or state constitutional provision granting authority over 
sovereign immunity to the legislature.7  Arkansas, on the other 
hand, remains one of only three states to have an express 
reservation of sovereign immunity in its state constitution.8 
This was not always the case.  The old Arkansas Constitution 
of 1868 originally granted the legislature the power to determine 
the State’s immunity, declaring, “[t]he General Assembly shall 
direct by law in what manner and in what courts suits may be 
brought by and against the state.”9  That language was altered 
with the adoption of the current version of the state constitution 
in 1874, the first to include an outright prohibition of suits against 
the State.10  Article V, Section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution 
now provides that “[t]he State of Arkansas shall never be made 
defendant in any of her courts.”11  Despite the seemingly broad 
and unambiguous language of that provision, Arkansas’s courts 
have struggled to furnish a comprehensive and coherent recitation 
of the scope of sovereign immunity under Section 20 since its 
inception, and the question of when the State may be hauled into 
its own courts still lacks a truly clear answer.12 
5. NCSL, supra note 2.
6. NCSL, supra note 2.
7. NCSL, supra note 2.
8. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 20.  Alabama and West Virginia are the other two.  See ALA.
CONST. art. I, § 14; W. VA. art. VI, § 35.  
9. ARK. CONST. of  1868, art. 5, § 45.
10.  HOWARD W. BRILL & CHRISTIAN H. BRILL, ARKANSAS LAW OF DAMAGES § 22:1
n.1 (6th ed. 2014) [hereinafter BRILL].
11. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 20 [hereinafter Section 20].  Unless otherwise noted, all
constitutional provisions mentioned in this article refer to provisions of the current Arkansas 
Constitution. 
12. Megan Hargraves & Devin R. Bates, Sovereign Immunity in Arkansas: Absolute
or Only a Bar to Monetary Recovery?, MITCHELL WILLIAMS (Mar. 1, 2018), 
http://www.mitchellwilliamslaw.com/sovereign-immunity-in-arkansas-absolute-or-only-a-
bar-to-monetary-recovery [https://perma.cc/6ACA-TX7G].  
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The sovereign immunity provision must be read together 
with article XVI, section 2, which requires the General Assembly 
to arrange payment of all “just and legal debts” incurred by the 
State.13  The legislature created the Arkansas State Claims 
Commission in 1949 for the sole purpose of resolving claims 
against the State that could not be heard by the courts.14  The 
Commission is a non-judicial forum where governor-appointed 
and senate-confirmed commissioners hold sole discretion over 
the merits and value of a claim.15  In Fireman’s Insurance Co. v. 
Arkansas State Claims Commission,16 the Arkansas Supreme 
Court declared that the Commission is considered an “arm of the 
General Assembly” with “total control over the determination of 
and subsequent funding for payment of the ‘just debts and 
obligations of the state’—all other avenues for redress through 
legal proceedings being barred by the sovereign immunity 
provision of the Arkansas Constitution . . . .. . .”17  As such, 
litigants may pursue their claims against the State only when an 
exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies.  
Troublingly though, there is no independent judicial tribunal to 
which claimants may appeal the Commission’s decisions, and 
instead, they are left to simply hope for the rightful outcome.18 
Although the Arkansas Supreme Courthas acknowledged 
the harshness of the doctrine in the past,18 it has rarely 
acknowledged the difficulty and complexity of interpreting the 
sovereign immunity clause.  Despite the Court’s20 declaration in 
Bryant v. Arkansas State Highway Commission that the language 
of Section 20 is “too plain to be misunderstood,”21 the Court is 
asked to interpret that very same language during almost every 
term.  Out of the mass of  litigation has come only a patchwork of 
inconsistent opinions that leaves practitioners at a loss for any real 
13. ARK. CONST. art. XVI, § 2.
14. Hanley v. Ark. State Claims Comm’n, 333 Ark. 159, 166, 970 S.W.2d 198, 201 
(1998). 
15.  Ark. Cmty. Correction v. Barnes, 2018 Ark. 122, at 18, 542 S.W.3d 841, 850 (Hart,
J., dissenting). 
16. 301 Ark. 451, 784 S.W.2d 771 (1990).
17. Id. at 458, 784 S.W.2d at 775.
18. Barnes, 2018 Ark. 122, at 20, 542 S.W.3d at 851 (Hart, J., dissenting).
18 See, e.g., Bryant,’ 233 Ark. 41, at 44, 342 S.W.2d at 417. 
20. Unless otherwise noted, all references to “the Court” herein refer to the Arkansas
Supreme Court.  
21. Bryant, 233 Ark. 41, at 44, 342 S.W.2d at 417.
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certainty.  Over time, the Court’s interpretations have slowly 
chipped away at the provision’s use of “never” to the point that 
the plain meaning of the word often has virtually no effect.22 
A. WHO IS PROTECTED BY THE STATE’S
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY? 
At its core, sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional immunity 
from suit.23  However, it operates as an affirmative defense that 
must be specifically asserted in responsive pleadings in order to 
preserve the defense.24  In the recent case of Walther v. FLIS 
Enterprises, the Court explicitly held that, despite its 
jurisdictional qualities, sovereign immunity is not an issue of 
subject-matter jurisdiction, reasoning that “it is not a limit on the 
court’s authority to hear a particular type of case.”25  In light of 
the Court’s subsequent holding in Arkansas Department of 
Veterans Affairs v. Mallett,26 it is not yet clear how strict the Court 
will apply the rules of pleading and preserving sovereign 
immunity as an affirmative defense.27  This issue, however, is just 
one of many that has come about as a result of the recent case of 
Board of Trustees v. Andrews28 and its progeny, as will be 
discussed below.29 
The Court has long held that the prohibition of suits against 
the State applies in both law and equity to bar any suit that has the 
purpose and effect of coercing the State either directly or 
indirectly.30  In addition to protecting the State and its agencies,31 
the doctrine extends to independent commissions of the State32 
22. See discussion infra Section II.
23. E.g., Duit Constr. Co. v. Ark. State Claims Comm’n, 2015 Ark. 462, at 5, 476 
S.W.3d 791, 795. 
24. Walther v. FLIS Enters., 2018 Ark. 64, at 4-5, 540 S.W.3d 264, 267. (citing Ark.
Lottery Comm’n v. Alpha Mktg., 2012 Ark. 23, at 6, 386 S.W.3d 400, 404); Ark. Lottery 
Comm’n v. Alpha Mktg., 2013 Ark. 232, at 8, 428 S.W.3d 415, 421 n.1. 
25. FLIS, 2018 Ark. 65, at 4-5, 540 S.W.3d at 267 (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. 2018 Ark. 217, at 2-3, 549 S.W.3d 351, 352. 
27. See infra Section III(A).
28. 2018 Ark. 12, 535 S.W.3d 616.
29. See infra Sections II(D) & III.
30. E.g., Watson v. Dodge, 187 Ark. 1055, 63 S.W.2d 993, 994 (1933).
31. E.g., Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. Eddings, 2011 Ark. 47, at 4, 378 S.W.3d 694, 
697. 
32. Ark. Lottery Comm’n v.Alpha Mktg., 2013 Ark. 232, at 6, 428 S.W.3d at  419;
Tri-B Advert., Inc. v. Ark. State Highway Comm’n, 260 Ark. 227, 229, 539 S.W.2d 430, 
431 (1976). 
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and state colleges and universities.33  Creative lawyers have tried 
and failed to circumvent the State’s express constitutional grant 
of immunity by suing a state employee or officer in their official 
capacity.34  The Court considers such actions tantamount to suits 
against the State.35 
Ultimately, whether an entity is protected by the State’s 
sovereign immunity turns on whether the pleadings show that the 
State is the real party in interest and if a judgement for the plaintiff 
would operate to control the actions of the State or subject it to 
financial liability.36  If so, it is said that the action is one against 
the State and the trial court acquires no jurisdiction unless an 
exception to the doctrine applies.37  Furthermore, although an 
order denying a motion to dismiss is normally not appealable, an 
interlocutory appeal is allowed if the denied motion was based on 
sovereign immunity,38 as the right to immunity from suit is lost if 
the case is allowed to proceed to trial.39 
B. OVERVIEW OF EXCEPTIONS
There are a number of exceptions to the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity under Arkansas law,40 but due to the Court’s 
inconsistent and contradictory language, understanding the scope 
and number of those exceptions is never as straightforward as the 
Court would like to suggest.  The aforementioned Fireman’s 
Insurance case is a prime example of a problematic sovereign 
immunity opinion from the Arkansas Supreme Court.  The Court 
categorically stated that “[t]he only exception to total and 
complete sovereign immunity from claims which has been 
recognized by this court occurs when the state is the moving party 
33. Wash. Cty. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ark., 2016 Ark. 34, at 13, 480 S.W.3d 
173, 181 (University of Arkansas entitled to sovereign immunity and therefore exempt from 
ad valorem taxation); Short v. Westark Cmty. Coll., 347 Ark. 497, 504-08, 65 S.W.3d 440, 
445-48 (2002) (community college entitled to sovereign immunity protection).  
34. See BRILL, supra note 9, at § 22:2.
35. Simons v. Marshall, 369 Ark. 447, 451, 255 S.W.3d 838, 841-42 (2007).
36. Ark. Dep’t of Cmty. Corr. v. City of Pine Bluff, 2013 Ark. 36, at 3-4, 425 S.W.3d 
731, 733-34; Brown v. Ark. State HVACR Licensing Bd., 336 Ark. 34, 37-38, 984 S.W.2d 
402, 403 (1999). 
37. City of Pine Bluff, 2013 Ark. 36, at 4, 425 S.W.3d at 734. 
38. ARK. R. APP. P. 2(a)(10).
39. Simons, 369 Ark. at 450, 255 S.W.3d at 841. 
40. Infra Part II.  See also BRILL, supra note 9.
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seeking specific relief.”41  This could not be further from the truth. 
Fireman’s Insurance completely ignores numerous other 
exceptions that had been well-recognized by the time that case 
was decided in 1990.42  These exceptions will be examined in 
detail in Part II.  For clarity, I will discuss these exceptions in 
terms of four broad categories: waiver by conduct, bad faith, 
miscellaneous, and statutory waiver. 
The first category of exceptions arises when immunity is 
waived by the State’s conduct.  The first of the exceptions in this 
category is the one mentioned in Fireman’s Insurance: the 
“specific relief” exception.  When the State decides to sue in its 
own courts and seek specific relief, it is treated like any other 
claimant.43  The second exception is when the State consents to 
suit and acquiesces to the court’s jurisdiction.44 
The second category includes the “bad faith” exception.  
This exception allows injunctions against the State when State 
agency officers  act illegally (“ultra vires”) or in bad faith.45  This 
category also includes the “ministerial act exception” whereby a 
plaintiff may seek a writ of mandamus if a State agency officer 
refuses to perform a purely ministerial action required by 
statute.46 
The third category of exceptions primarily entails the 
exception allowing declaratory judgments and federal law 
considerations.47 
Finally, the fourth category, waiver by statute, concern 
circumstances where an act of the legislature authorizes a suit 
against the State.  For over twenty years, the Court recognized 
that the General Assembly had the power to provide the State’s 
consent to suit through legislation, but this changed completely in 
41. Fireman’s Ins. Co. v. Ark. State Claims Comm’n, 301 Ark. 451, 455, 784 S.W.2d 
771, 774 (1990) (emphasis added) (citing Parker v. Moore, 222 Ark. 811, 262 S.W.2d 891 
(1953)). 
42.  See Jack Druff, State Court Sovereign Immunity: Just When is the Emperor Armor-
Clad?, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 255, 257-58 (2002).  See also infra Part II. 
43. Foster v. Ark. State Highway Comm’n, 258 Ark. 176, 184, 527 S.W.2d 601, 606 
(1975); see also BRILL, supra note 9. 
44. See infra Part II(A)(2).
45. BRILL, supra note 9.
46. BRILL, supra note 9.
47. See infra Part II(C); see also BRILL, supra note 9.
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Board of Trustees v. Andrews.48  The Court has now renewed its 
former commitment to the position that Section 20 immunity 
cannot be waived by a statute.49 
II. EXCEPTIONS TO THE STATE’S IMMUNNITY
The Court’s irregular holdings make it continually difficult 
for practitioners to decipher just when the State may be subject to 
suit.  The lack of any one source to provide a thorough exposition 
of sovereign immunity in Arkansas only compounds this 
problem, as busy lawyers are left to unscramble the dense and 
complex thicket of case law on their own.  The following 
discussion is an attempt to piece together the Arkansas Supreme 
Court’s variable opinions and provide a guide as to when the State 
is and is not protected by sovereign immunity under Section 20. 
This overview is divided into four subparts.  Subpart A 
outlines when the State may waive its immunity by conduct.  
Subpart B examines the “bad faith” category of exceptions.  
Subpart C explores two miscellaneous exceptions.  Finally, 
Subpart D discusses the ever-changing status of statutory waiver 
and the impact of the Court’s recent decision that the legislature 
does not have the power to waive the State’s immunity by statute. 
A. WAIVER BY CONDUCT EXCEPTIONS
The waiver by conduct category encompasses the best-
established exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity as 
well as those severely lacking in definition.  This subsection will 
discuss the specific relief exception, consent to suit, and waiver 
by other conduct. 
1. Specific Relief Exception50
The specific relief exception is the most consistently 
recognized exception to Section 20 immunity and typically the 
least controversial, as it rests on the sound logic that the State, “by 
48. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ark. v. Andrews, 2018 Ark. 12, at 10-12, 535 S.W.3d 616, 
622-23. 
49. Id. 
50. Sometimes referred to as the “affirmative-relief exception.”  LandsnPulaski, LLC 
v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 372 Ark. 40, 43, 269 S.W.3d 793, 796 (2007).
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virtue of its sovereignty,” has the right to sue in her own courts.51  
The Court has said repeatedly that, “[t]he only exception to total 
and complete sovereign immunity . . . . . .occurs when the state is 
the moving party seeking specific relief.”52  This means that when 
the State decides to sue in her own courts, she is treated like any 
other litigant, subject to the same restrictions as private suitors, 
and “must submit to and abide by the results.”53  Therefore, if the 
State initiates the action, it waives its constitutional protection and 
cannot then raise the defense of sovereign immunity as a defense 
to a counterclaim.54  The defense is waived even in the case that 
the State’s only avenue for redress is to file suit.55 
This exception to the doctrine does not only apply when the 
State initiates a lawsuit, however, since the Court’s language 
dictates that the State must only be a moving party seeking 
specific relief.  As such, the State may waive its immunity and 
subject itself to judgment if it files a counterclaim seeking 
affirmative relief in a responsive pleading, even though the 
answer also raises the defense of sovereign immunity.56  The 
Arkansas Lottery Commission narrowly avoided this result in 
Alpha Marketing.57  In its answer to Alpha’s original complaint, 
the Commission requested a declaratory judgment canceling 
certain trademarks held by Alpha.58  It subsequently dropped this 
request in its answers to Alpha’s first and second amended 
complaints, but on appeal, Alpha argued that the Commission had 
nonetheless incorporated the request in its later answers.59  
Ultimately, the Court found that the pleadings then in front of 
them (the answer to the second amended complaint) properly 
51. See Ark. State Highway Comm’n v. Partain, 193 Ark. 803, 805, 103 S.W.2d 53, 
54 (1937) (citing Wilson v. Parkinson 157 Ark. 69, 247 S.W. 774 (1923)). 
52. LandsnPulaski, 372 Ark. at 43, 269 S.W.3d at 796; Fireman’s Ins. Co. v. Ark.
State Claims Comm’n, 301 Ark. 451, 455, 784 S.W.2d 771, 774 (1990). 
53. Foster v. Ark. State Highway Comm’n, 258 Ark. 176, 184, 527 S.W.2d 601, 606 
(1975). 
54. Fireman’s Ins., 301 Ark. at 455, 784 S.W.2d at 774 (citing Parker v. Moore, 222 
Ark. 801, 262 S.W.2d 891 (1953)). 
55. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ark. v. Pulaski Cty., 2013 Ark. 230, at 3-4, No. CV-12-
829, 2013 WL 2382600, at *2 (May 30, 2013) (plaintiff was a university and therefore the 
moving party seeking relief and could not claim sovereign immunity later in the suit). 
56. See Ark. Lottery Comm’n v. Alpha Mktg., 2013 Ark. 232, at 8-9, 428 S.W.3d 415, 
420-21; see also BRILL, supra note 9. 
57. See Alpha Mktg., 2013 Ark. 232, at 8-9, 426 S.W.3d at 420-21. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
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raised the defense of sovereign immunity and did not seek 
affirmative relief.60  If nothing else, this case should serve as a 
keen reminder of the importance of careful pleading and the 
general impact of word choice, for without the alterations to its 
answers, the Commission very well may have waived its 
immunity. 
This should not be taken to mean that anytime the State 
requests relief in a pleading that it is necessarily waiving its 
immunity.  To waive the defense of sovereign immunity, “the 
request for relief must be specific.”61  Though it has not expanded 
much on what it considers a “specific” request, the Court in 
LandsnPulaski made clear that an answer raising sovereign 
immunity and asking for “all other appropriate relief” is not a 
sufficiently specific request for affirmative relief constituting a 
waiver of the State’s immunity defense.62  Similarly, the State 
does not waive its immunity defense and is not considered subject 
to suit when it acts pursuant to a statute in order to collect child 
support for the benefit of parents, seek custody of neglected 
juveniles, or commence paternity actions.63 
2. Consent to Suit
Whereas the waiver of immunity under the specific relief 
exception may be inadvertent or involuntary, consent to suit is the 
voluntary waiver of immunity by the State.  The idea is that the 
State, in her sovereign wisdom, may elect to appear in court and 
acquiesce to the court’s jurisdiction.64  Like any other situation in 
which the State is not protected by Section 20 immunity, if the 
State voluntarily waives its immunity, it is treated like any other 
litigant and is bound by the outcome of the litigation.65 
While the concept of voluntary waiver is fairly 
straightforward, the State’s ability to consent has never been as 
60. Id. 
61. LandsnPulaski, LLC v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 372 Ark. 40, 44, 269 S.W.3d 793, 796 
(2007) (emphasis in original). 
62. Id. 
63. State Office of Child Support Enf’t v. Mitchell, 330 Ark. 338, 346-48, 954 S.W.2d 
907, 911-12 (1997); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. State, 312 Ark. 481, 488-89, 850 S.W.2d 
847, 851 (1993).  See also BRILL, supra note 9. 
64. See BRILL, supra note 9.
65. See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 340 Ark. 481, 496, 10 S.W.3d 892, 
901 (2000); see also BRILL, supra note 9. 
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clear due to the Court’s inconsistent and confusing opinions on 
the subject.  The Court has frequently and flatly declared that 
Section 20 prohibits consent to suit, 66 while also holding that 
sovereign immunity is a defense that may be waived.67  In Grine 
v. Board of Trustees,68 the Court echoed this sentiment,
proclaiming that consent to suit is “expressly withheld by the
Constitution of this State.”69  The Court then went on to hold that
“sovereign immunity is jurisdictional immunity from suit, and
where the pleadings show the action is one against the State,
the trial court acquires no jurisdiction.  However, unlike subject-
matter jurisdiction, sovereign immunity can be waived.”70  So, it
would appear that the State is in fact allowed to consent to
suit/voluntarily waive sovereign immunity.  The Court did not
offer a distinction between waiving the defense and “consenting”
to suit, and there does not appear to be one.
A number of older cases took the hardline position that all 
suits against the State are forbidden by the state constitution, and 
as such, the State does not have the ability to consent to suit.71  
Those cases seemed more concerned with the General Assembly 
providing the State’s consent to suit through a statutory waiver of 
immunity,72 which was recently held to be an unconstitutional 
practice.73  In more recent cases, however, the Court has 
frequently held that the State may in fact voluntarily waive the 
66. See, e.g., Fairbanks v. Sheffield, 226 Ark. 703, 706, 292 S.W.2d 82, 84 (1956)
(holding that sovereign immunity is a constitutional mandate that “cannot be waived by the 
General Assembly”). 
67. Druff, supra note 41, at 260.
68. 338 Ark. 791, 2 S.W.3d 54 (1999).
69. Id. at 796, 2 S.W.3d at 58 (quoting Pitcock v. State, 91 Ark. 527, 535, 121 S.W. 
742, 745 (1909)). 
70. Id. at 796-97, 2 S.W.3d at 58 (emphasis added) (citing Brown v. Ark. State
HVACR Licensing Bd., 336 Ark. 34, 984 S.W.2d 402 (1999)). 
71. E.g., Ark. State Highway Comm’n v. McNeil, 222 Ark. 643, 644-45, 262 S.W.2d 
129, 130 (1953); Ark. State Highway Comm’n v. Nelson Bros., 191 Ark. 629, 636, 87 
S.W.2d 394, 397 (1935) (discussing consent to suit through statute).  But see Page v. 
McKinley, 196 Ark. 331, 336-37, 118 S.W.2d 235, 237-38 (1938) (considering that suits 
against the state “cannot be maintained without its consent.”). 
72. Fairbanks v. Sheffield, 226 Ark. 703, 706, 292 S.W.2d 82, 84 (1956) (holding that
a statute permitting suits against the state park system was “an unconstitutional attempt on 
the part of the legislature to consent to a suit against the State”).  The United States Supreme 
Court also considers statutory waiver as a consent to suit. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 
(1999) (“Many States, on their own initiative, have enacted statutes consenting to a wide 
variety of suits.”). 
73. See infra Part II(D).
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defense.74  One problem arises in that, although the newer cases 
contradict the older ones, those cases have not been specifically 
overturned.75  Another issue, mentioned above, is the Court’s 
tendency to echo the old cases while simultaneously remaining 
in-step with modern precedent that recognizes consent to suit as 
an exception to Section 20 immunity, such as in Grine.76  These 
problems can also be easily rectified with more uniform 
articulations of the law that distinguish between when the Court 
is referring to consent through statute or consent though some 
other means, such as a voluntary appearance. 
In her dissent in Andrews, Justice Baker advanced a credible 
argument that the plain language of Section 20 itself may imply 
the State’s ability to consent to suit.77  Turning to the dictionary, 
Justice Baker asserted that the framers of the constitution 
intended the word “made” as used in Section 20 to mean 
“compel.”78  Accepting this as true, Section 20 can sensibly be 
interpreted to mean that the State cannot be compelled to become 
a defendant in her courts but may freely allow herself to be sued.79  
However, a majority of the Court has yet to embrace this view 
and indeed has not specifically ruled on this definitional 
question.80 
In the face of its oscillating precedent, the Court in Lake 
View confidently declared that, “[i]t is axiomatic that the State of 
Arkansas can voluntarily waive a sovereign-immunity defense.  
In addition, the State can consent to being sued.”81  Given this 
syntax, it appears that the Court has again drawn some undefined 
distinction between a voluntary waiver of the defense and consent 
74.  E.g., Short v. Westark Cmty. Coll., 347 Ark. 497, 504, 65 S.W.3d 440, 445 (2002);
Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 340 Ark. 481, 496, 10 S.W.3d 892, 901 (2000); 
Grine v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ark., 338 Ark. 791, 797, 2 S.W.3d 54, 58 (1999); Ozarks 
Unlimited Res. Coop. v. Daniels, 333 Ark. 214, 221, 969 S.W.2d 169, 172 (1998). 
75. BRILL, supra note 9.
76. Grine, 338 Ark. at 796-97, 2 S.W.3d at 58.
77. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ark. v. Andrews, 2018 Ark. 12, at 13-14, 535 S.W.3d 
616, 624 (Baker, J., dissenting).  Although Andrews focused the state’s ability to consent 
through a statutory waiver, Justice Baker’s argument is nonetheless applicable to the broader 




81. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 340 Ark. 481, 496, 10 S.W.3d 892, 901
(2000) (citations omitted). 
772 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  71:3 
to suit, as it did in Grine.82  As mentioned above, there is no 
apparent difference in the two terms unless the Court is 
contemplating that voluntary waiver to include a situation where 
the State is the moving party seeking relief, with the waiver being 
“voluntary” in the sense that the State’s attorneys know or should 
know that seeking specific relief will waive the defense.  In any 
event, the legal profession can take a modicum of comfort and 
confidence in the Lake View Court’s explicit declaration of the 
State’s ability to consent to suit, because most opinions only 
contemplate the State’s capacity to consent in a cursory fashion.83  
Still, precedent reveals that capacity to be far from “axiomatic,” 
and, considering the recent Andrews opinion,84 it remains open to 
dramatic shifts in judicial attitudes. 
3. Waiver by Other Conduct
It is a well-established principle that a state cannot act except 
through its officers.85  But at what point does an officer’s conduct 
waive the State’s constitutional guarantee of immunity?  The two 
exceptions above seem to dictate that the State must either seek 
specific, affirmative relief, or it must give its knowing consent to 
be sued.  The cases, however, suggest that state officers can 
unintentionally consent by their actions, thereby waiving 
immunity and subjecting the State to liability. 
The Court first opened up this possibility in the Lake View 
case.  That decision stands out in the Court’s sovereign immunity 
jurisprudence not only because it explicitly proclaims the State’s 
power to consent to suit86 but also because of the manner in which 
the Court found the State had given its consent.87  In Lake View, 
attorneys for the school district sought fees from the State, 
82. See supra Part I(B).
83. See, e.g., Newton v. Etoch, 332 Ark. 325, 332, 965 S.W.2d 96, 99 (1998) (quoting
Page v. McKinley, 169 Ark. 331, 336-37, 118 S.W.2d 235, 238 (1938)); Ozarks Unlimited 
Res. Coop. v. Daniels, 333 Ark. 214, 221, 969 S.W.2d 169, 172 (1998); State Office of Child 
Support Enf’t v. Mitchell, 330 Ark. 338, 346-47, 954 S.W.2d 907, 911 (1997). 
84. See infra Part II(C).
85. Grine v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ark., 338 Ark. 791, 797, 2 S.W.3d 54, 58 
(1999) (citing Pitcock v. State, 91 Ark. 527, 121 S.W. 742 (1909)). 
86. See supra Part II(A)(2).
87. See Druff, supra note 41, at 268. 
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arguing that their work had benefitted the State as a whole.88  The 
majority, therefore, concluded that the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity applied to the case because the State’s treasury would 
have to be tapped to pay the attorneys for work benefitting the 
State.89  In an effort to settle this claim and resolve the dispute, 
the Attorney General’s office approved two published notices to 
class members supporting the payment of fees and continued to 
advocate in chancery court for their payment.90  The Court found 
that these actions amounted to a waiver of the State’s sovereign 
immunity defense with respect to payment of the fees.91  Taken 
to the extreme, this unprecedented finding could mean that the 
Court might find a waiver of immunity where the State’s conduct 
simply suggests that the State bears some liability in a certain 
lawsuit, even when it has not sought affirmative relief and has not 
expressly consented to suit.92 
This method of waiving the State’s immunity was argued 
again only months after Lake View in the Milberg93 case.  In 
Milberg, the State settled claims against tobacco companies by 
consent decree and the Attorney General requested that the 
appellant attorneys be included on a list of outside counsel set to 
receive attorney fees from the tobacco companies as part of the 
settlement.94  The appellants argued that their work had benefitted 
the State as a whole and that the Attorney General’s actions were 
similar to the Attorney General’s actions in Lake View, and thus, 
’Lake View supported a finding of waiver in their case.95  The 
Court, however, distinguished Lake View on the grounds that the 
fees in that case were to be paid out of state funds and the State’s 
88. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 340 Ark. 481, 495-96, 10 S.W.3d 892, 
900-01 (2000).  While the majority agreed with the attorneys, calling the benefit they 
provided to the state “beyond dispute,” id. at 496, 10 S.W.3d at 901, at least one justice 
disagreed: “As noble as this statement is and in reality how true it may be, the record is 
devoid of any evidence as to the ‘substantial economic benefit’ the State has received and no 
evidence has been offered upon which a percentage fee could be calculated.”  Id. at 340 Ark. 
at 499, 10 S.W.3d at 903 (Dalby, J., concurring).  This economic benefit argument was 
unsuccessful in a subsequent suit. See infra notes 92-97 and accompanying text. 
89. Lake View, 340 Ark. at 496, 10 S.W.3d at 901.
90. Id. 
91. Id., 340 Ark. at 496, 10 S.W.3d at 901.
92. See Druff, supra note 41, at 265.
93.  Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes, & Lerach, LLP v. State, 342 Ark. 303, 28 S.W.3d 
842 (2000). 
94. Id. at 322, 28 S.W.3d at 855. 
95. Id. at 321-22, 28 S.W.3d at 854-55. 
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attorneys had continued to advocate for the payment of the fees; 
whereas in Milberg, the fees would come out of the tobacco 
companies’ pockets and the State stopped advocating for the 
payment of the fees on appellants’ behalf.96  Despite not finding 
a waiver in Milberg as it did in Lake View, the Court nonetheless 
acknowledged that the State might waive its immunity through 
executive branch conduct in settlement negotiations.97  As such, 
these holdings appear to condone a finding that the State has 
waived its immunity even when its conduct is far removed from 
the notion of a request for specific relief or a conscious 
acquiescence to a court’s jurisdiction.98  
Given the Court’s recent dedication to considering sovereign 
immunity as an affirmative defense,99 it is now entirely possible 
that in every lawsuit against the State, the attorneys representing 
the State entity can singlehandedly waive the State’s Section 20 
immunity – “either as a result of poor lawyering skills, negligent 
omission, or even as a matter of trial strategy.”100  This result 
seems quite distant from the purportedly strict interpretation of 
Section 20 that the current Court has embraced in recent cases.101  
The United States Supreme Court has sharply criticized allowing 
this “constructive consent” to waive a state’s sovereign 
immunity,102 and in the interest of coherence, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court would do well to follow suit and make clear that 
consent to suit should only be found when the State has 
intentionally relinquished or abandoned its right to protection 
from suit. 
B. THE “BAD FAITH” EXCEPTIONS
While the State must act through its officers,103 the State 
does not have the authority to authorize its agencies or officers to 
96. Id. at 323, 28 S.W.3d at 855.
97. See id.
98. See Milberg, 342 Ark. at 321-23, 28 S.W.3d at 854-55. 
99. See supra Section I(A).
100. Walther v. FLIS Enterprises, 2018 Ark. 64, at 23-24, 540 S.W.3d 264, 276 
(Baker, J., dissenting). 
101. See infra Section II(D).
102. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 678 (1999); Druff, supra note 41, at 266 n.66. 
103. Grine v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ark., 338 Ark. 791, 797, 2 S.W.3d 54, 58 
(1999) (citing Pitcock v. State, 91 Ark. 527, 121 S.W. 742 (1909)). 
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violate the law.104  The two exceptions to Section 20 immunity in 
this category – the “ultra vires” and ministerial act exceptions – 
deal with situations in which the State or its employees/officers 
are acting outside their authority or not acting when required. 
1. The “Ultra Vires” Exception
The Court has routinely held that Section 20 does not protect 
the State, its agencies, or its officers if they are acting “ultra vires” 
(beyond their authority) or in a way that is otherwise illegal, 
wanton, injurious, in bad faith, arbitrary, or capricious.105  If an 
officer or arm of the State acts in such a way, the courts have 
equity jurisdiction to issue injunctions and restrain those 
actions.106  Courts may also enjoin state action that will cause 
irreparable injury107 or result in the taking of private property 
without compensation.108  Such suits are allowed to proceed 
against the State under the logic that an injunction preventing the 
State or its officers from acting illegally or ultra vires does not 
control the (lawful) actions of the State or subject it to financial 
liability.109  Indeed, the Court has specifically stated that, “it is the 
effect of tapping the state treasury that makes the State a 
defendant.”110  Accordingly, the trial court is charged with 
determining whether an action actually seeks an injunction 
against the State on legitimate grounds or impermissibly petitions 
to coerce the State.111  Finally, it is important to consider that the 
injunction must be brought in a timely fashion, as the Court has 
said that landowners cannot sit idly by and watch the State take, 
104. Ralls v. Mittlesteadt, 268 Ark. App. 741, 744, 596 S.W.2d 349, 351 (1980).
105. E.g., Key v. Curry, 2015 Ark. 392, at 4, 473 S.W.3d 1, 4-5 (actions of the State
Board of Education in taking control of the Little Rock School District allowed by statute 
and not ultra vires); Grine, 338 Ark. at 798-99, 2 S.W.3d at 59. 
106. Grine, 338 Ark. at 798-99, 2 S.W.3d at 59.
107. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. Lindsey, 292 Ark. 314, 320, 730 S.W.2d 474, 478 
(1987). 
108. Austin v. Ark. State Highway Comm’n, 320 Ark. 292, 294, 895 S.W.2d 941, 942 
(1995). 
109. See State Office of Child Support Enf’t v. Mitchell, 330 Ark. 338, 346-47, 954 
S.W.2d 907, 911 (1997); BRILL, supra note 9. Cf. Comm’n on Jud. Discipline & Disability 
v. Digby, 303 Ark. 24, 26, 792 S.W.2d 594, 595 (1990) (talking about declaratory judgments,
see infra Part II(D), but echoing the view that a suit is not one against the State if it would
not place the State under a financial obligation).
110. Mitchell, 330 Ark. at 347, 954 S.W.2d at 911.
111. BRILL, supra note 9.
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occupy, or damage their land because the ensuing action would 
be one for damages and therefore a prohibited coercive suit.112  It 
follows that similar delays in the case of a threatened irreparable 
injury would also bar a later suit for damages. 
As discussed further below, the Court recently held in the 
Andrews case that the legislature cannot waive sovereign 
immunity by statute.113  On the same day the Court issued that 
opinion, it also issued an opinion in Williams v. McCoy, wherein 
the Court again recognized the illegal acts exception.114  
However, the Court included the following in a footnote: 
We recently held in Andrews that a legislative statute that 
waives sovereign immunity is unconstitutional.  While we 
are mindful that there may in the future be a constitutional 
challenge to the illegal acts exception, that issue was not 
argued in this case; therefore, we do not address it here.115 
As such, in the wake of Andrews, Williams, and the cases 
following them, it appears that the validity of the illegal acts 
exception remains an open question,116 and indeed it might not be 
considered constitutional by the time this comment reaches 
publication. 
2. The Ministerial Act Exception
Courts of this state also have the power to issue writs of 
mandamus – a type of mandatory injunction against state agencies 
or officers who refuse to do a purely ministerial (not 
discretionary) act required by statute.117  Mandamus actions have 
been consistently recognized and allowed in Arkansas,118 but not 
112. Bryant v. Ark. State Highway Comm’n, 233 Ark. 41, 43, 342 S.W.2d 415, 416-
17 (1961). 
113. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ark. v. Andrews, 2018 Ark. 12, at 11, 535 S.W.3d 
616, 622; infra Section II(D). 
114. Williams v. McCoy, 2018 Ark. 17, at 3, 535 S.W.3d 266, 268.
115. Id. at 3, 535 S.W.3d at 268 n.1 (internal citation omitted).
116. See Ark. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs v. Mallett, 2018 Ark. 217, at 6, 549 S.W.3d 
351, 354 (Goodson, J., dissenting). 
117. LandsnPulaski, LLC v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 372 Ark. 40, 43, 269 S.W.3d 793, 
795-96 (2007) (no ministerial act); Clowers v. Lassiter, 363 Ark. 241, 244-45, 213 S.W.3d 
6, 9-10 (2005) (petition sought to force a state agency to do something more than a purely 
ministerial duty, so mandamus inappropriate). 
118. LandsnPulaski, 372 Ark. at 43, 269 S.W.3d at 795-96; Hickenbottom v. McCain,
207 Ark. 485, 490, 181 S.W.2d 226, 228 (1944); Golden v. McCarroll, 196 Ark. 443, 446, 
118 S.W.2d 252, 254 (1938). 
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without restriction.  Just as with the ultra vires exception, a 
mandamus proceeding cannot be maintained against state 
agencies or officers if its true purpose is to recover damages or 
otherwise improperly coerce the State to act.119 
C. OTHER EXCEPTIONS
There are two other instances when the State is not protected
from suit by Section 20: declaratory judgments and certain times 
under federal law. 
1. Declaratory Judgments
Declaratory judgments, much like injunctions to bar the 
State from acting beyond its authority or force it to carry out a 
statutory duty, are allowed so long as they would not operate to 
coerce the State to act.120  An action for declaratory relief cannot 
be maintained if the effect of the judgment would cause the State 
to bear a financial obligation,121 force it to file a counterclaim on 
a contractual dispute,122 or compel discretionary agency action.123  
Perhaps the best example of an allowable action for declaratory 
relief would be a plaintiff seeking a declaration of whether a State 
agency or officer violated a rule or law.124 
2. Federal Reasons
Suits against the State in state court might not be barred if 
they are based on a federal statutory cause of action because the 
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution trumps the 
state constitution.125  However, the United States Supreme Court 
in Alden v. Maine held that “[s]tates retain [their] immunity from 
private suits in their own courts.”126  Finally, when it comes to 
119. Bryant v. Ark. State Highway Comm’n, 233 Ark. 41, 43-44, 342 S.W.2d 415, 
416-17 (1961). 
120. Comm’n on Jud. Discipline & Disability v. Digby, 303 Ark. 24, 26, 792 S.W.2d 
594, 595 (1990). 
121. Id. 
122. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of America v. Ark. State Highway Comm’n, 353 Ark.
721, 728-29, 120 S.W.3d 50, 53-55 (2003) (claim based on surety bond). 
123. See Grine v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ark., 338 Ark. 791, 798-99, 2 S.W.3d 54, 
59 (1999). 
124. Digby, 303 Ark. at 26, 792 S.W.2d at 595.
125. See BRILL, supra note 9.
126. 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) (emphasis added).
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federal court, Section 20 offers no protection.127  Congress often 
attaches conditions to the receipt of federal grants or other federal 
dollars, and the states will periodically acquiesce to suit in federal 
court as a condition to receiving those funds.128 
D. ANDREWS AND THE QUESTION OF WAIVER
BY STATUTE
For more than twenty years, the Arkansas Supreme Court 
consistently recognized that the General Assembly had the power 
to waive the State’s Section 20 immunity by statute, thereby 
providing the State’s consent to suit and creating another 
exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity.129  This came to 
an abrupt halt on January 18, 2018, when the Court issued its 
opinion in Andrews, wherein it returned to its former precedent 
and held that the legislature does not, in fact, have the power to 
waive Section 20 immunity by statute.130  With one stroke of the 
pen, the Court overturned more than two decades of cases131 and 
opened the door to an untold number of yet-to-be-realized 
consequences.132  While this drastic change in the law was 
unanticipated, it should not have come as a shock.  To understand 
why, one must look at the history of the Court’s on-again/off-
again relationship with statutory waiver. 
As noted above, the predecessor to the Arkansas 
Constitution of 1874 granted the General Assembly the power to 
determine how and when the State could be sued, like the majority 
of states do today.133  In reaching their decision, the Andrews 
court emphasized that the framers of the current constitution 
removed the language permitting the legislature to waive the 
127. This is apparent from the very language of Section 20: “[t]he State of Arkansas
shall never be made a defendant in any of her courts.” (emphasis added).  See ARK. CONST. 
art. V, § 20.   
128. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 697 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (pointing out the coercive effects of tying education 
and highway grants to a waiver of immunity). 
129. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ark. v. Andrews, 2018 Ark. 12, at 16-17,
535 S.W.3d 616, 625-26 (Baker, J., dissenting). 
130. Id. at 9-12, 535 S.W.3d at 622-23. 
131. For a list of most of the cases in which the Court recognized statutory waiver as
a valid exception to Section 20 immunity, see id. at 17, 535 S.W.3d at 626 n.2 (Baker, J., 
dissenting). 
132. See id. at 13-19, 535 S.W.3d at 624-27 (Baker, J., dissenting); infra Part III.
133. See supra Part I. 
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State’s immunity by statute – the only way a legislature can act – 
and instead chose to use the word “never” in Section 20.134  The 
majority opinion in Andrews appears to imply that the first case 
to look at the issue of statutory waiver came in 1935.135  However, 
there were at least three cases prior to 1935 that considered the 
legislature’s ability to waive the State’s immunity through 
statute.136 
The first of these, Dodge I, came in 1930.137  In its opinion, 
the Court contemplated an Alabama case interpreting that state’s 
immunity provision – one nearly identical to Section 20 – which 
held that the legislature did not have the capacity to waive 
immunity.138  The Dodge I court stated that it felt “constrained to 
give the same construction to the same provision in our own 
Constitution”139 but allowed a suit to be maintained on a contract, 
finding it not to be a suit against the State.140  Two years later, the 
Court in Baer v. Arkansas State Highway Commission followed 
its ruling in Dodge I, finding that the Highway Commission could 
be sued on claims authorized by statute, but held that the statute 
creating the Highway Commission did not allow for tort 
claims.141  Later that same year, the Court issued its ruling in 
Dodge II (unrelated to Dodge I), wherein it held that the plaintiffs 
could maintain all suits authorized by statute  against the Highway 
Commission.142  Despite the fractured and confusing nature of 
these cases, it appears that the Court, at least for a few years, 
134. Andrews, 2018 Ark. 12, at 10-11, 535 S.W.3d at 622.
135. See id. at 6, 535 S.W.3d at 620; id. at 16, 535 S.W.3d at 625 (Baker, J., 
dissenting). 
136. Ark. State Highway Comm’n v. Dodge, 186 Ark. 640, 55 S.W.2d 71, 73 (1932)
[hereinafter Dodge II], overruled in part by Ark. State Highway Comm’n v. Nelson Bros., 
191 Ark. 629, 87 S.W.2d 394 (1935); Baer v. Ark. State Highway Comm’n, 185 Ark. 590, 
48 S.W.2d 842 (1932), overruled in part by Ark. State Highway Comm’n v. Nelson Bros., 
191 Ark. 629, 87 S.W.2d 394 (1935); Ark. State Highway Comm’n v. Dodge, 181 Ark. 539, 
26 S.W.2d 879 (1930) [hereinafter Dodge I], overruled in part by Ark. State Highway 
Comm’n v. Nelson Bros., 191 Ark. 629, 87 S.W.2d 394 (1935). 
137. Dodge I, 181 Ark. 539, 26 S.W.2d 879 (1930). 
138. Id. at 542, 26 S.W.2d at 880.
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 551, 26 S.W.2d at 884.
141. Baer, 185 Ark. at 591, 48 S.W.2d at 843.
142.  Dodge II, 186 Ark. 640,  646, 55 S.W.2d 71, 73 (“[W]e now hold that, in all cases
where the statute authorizes a suit, it may be maintained against the highway commission 
whether it be thought to be a juristic person or whether section 20, art. 5, be merely 
declaratory of the general doctrine that the state may not be sued in her courts unless she has 
consented thereto.”). 
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recognized an ability in the legislature to consent to suits through 
its lawmaking process. 
This view was short-lived, however.  In 1935, the Court 
explicitly overruled the three above cases in Arkansas State 
Highway Commission v. Nelson Brothers,143 the first statutory 
waiver case mentioned by the majority in Andrews.144  In that case 
the Court took a strict approach in its reversal, expressing 
concerns about the impulsivity borne from the “human element” 
of the legislature, and referring to the decision in Dodge II as 
“indefensible.”145  It went on to flatly state: “[i]t is our settled 
conviction that the state cannot give its consent to the 
maintenance of an action against it . . . .”146   The Court followed 
this precedent some years later in Fairbanks v. Sheffield,147 where 
the Court held that a statute authorizing suits against the state park 
system amounted to “an unconstitutional attempt on the part of 
the legislature to consent to a suit against the State.”148  Citing 
Nelson Brothers, the Court expressly declared that Section 20 is 
“mandatory and cannot be waived by the General Assembly.”149  
Decades later, in 1993, the Court held that courts cannot order the 
state Department of Human Services to pay certain costs and 
restitution even though it was authorized by statute.150 
After more than sixty years of holding that the legislature 
was powerless to waive the state’s immunity by statute, the 
Court’s attitude flipped again in 1996 with two cases – Staton151 
and Tedder.152  Both cases concerned a statute153 that allowed 
taxpayers to sue the State if their refund claim had been filed and 
143. 191 Ark. 629, 637, 87 S.W.2d 394, 397 (1935).
144. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ark. v. Andrews, 2018 Ark. 12, at 6, 535 S.W.3d 616, 
620. 
145. Nelson Bros., 191 Ark. 629, 636, 87 S.W.2d 394, 397 (1935). 
146. Id. 
147. 226 Ark. 703, 292 S.W.2d 82 (1956).
148. Id. at 706, 292 S.W.2d at 84.
149. Id. (citing Nelson Bros., 191 Ark. at 634, 87 S.W.2d at 396).
150. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. State, 312 Ark. 481, 486-89, 850 S.W.2d 847, 850-
51 (1993). 
151. Ark. Dep’t of Fin. & Admin. v. Staton, 325 Ark. 341, 344, 942 S.W.2d 804, 805 
(1996). 
152. Ark. Dep’t of Fin. & Admin. v. Tedder, 326 Ark. 495, 496-97, 932 S.W.2d 755, 
756 (1996). 
153. ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-18-507(e)(2)(A) (Repl. 1992).
2019 TOO PLAIN TO BE MISUNDERSTOOD 781 
refused or was not acted upon.154  The Court came to the 
conclusion in both Staton and Tedder that, in light of fiscal policy 
concerns, the State’s sovereign immunity was waived once 
taxpayers had fully complied with the statute.’155  From the time 
of those decisions until the recent Andrews case, the Court 
consistently held that the legislature could waive Section 20 
immunity by statute.156 
In Andrews, a former employee of a state college sought 
relief under the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act (“AMWA”).157  
The General Assembly enacted a 2006 provision158 that allowed 
suits against the State under the AMWA.159  In light of pre-1996 
case law, the Court said that this provision was “repugnant”160 to 
Section 20 and chose to repudiate the cases following Staton and 
Tedder, finding instead that the precedent of Nelson Brothers and 
Fairbanks was the correct path to follow.161  Thus, as of the 
writing of this article, the law in Arkansas does not allow the 
legislature to provide the State’s consent to suit through statutory 
waiver.162  “In reaching this conclusion,” the Court said, “we 
interpret the constitutional provision, ‘The State of Arkansas shall 
never be made a defendant in any of her courts,’ precisely as it 
reads.”163  This hardline approach has now created a new layer of 
uncertainty in Arkansas’s sovereign immunity precedent because 
no one yet knows how far the current Court is willing to extend 
its strict interpretation from Andrews, nor what the full impacts of 
that decision will be once Andrews is put into practice.  Justice 
Baker outlined many of the problems that may arise in her strong 
dissent, yet she was unable to sway the majority.164 
154. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ark. v. Andrews, 2018 Ark. 12, at 7, 535 S.W.3d 616, 
620. 
155. Tedder, 326 Ark. at 496-97, 932 S.W.2d at 756; Staton, 325 Ark. at 344, 942 
S.W.2d at 805. 
156. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
157. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 11-4-201 to -222 (Repl. 2012 & Supp. 2017); Andrews,
2018 Ark. at 1, 535 S.W.3d at 617. 
158. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-218(e) (Repl. 2012 & Supp. 2017). 
159. Andrews, 2018 Ark. 12, at 8, 535 S.W.3d at 621.
160. Id. at 10, 535 S.W.3d at 622.
161. See id. at 11-12, 535 S.W.3d at 623.
162. Id. at 10, 535 S.W.3d at 622.
163. Id. 
164. Andrews, 2018 Ark. 12, at 13-19, 535 S.W.3d at 624-27 (Baker, J., dissenting).
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III. THE PROBLEMS OF ANDREWS AND
SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENNTS
Beyond inciting the confusion that comes along with 
upending over twenty years of precedent, the Andrews opinion 
limits the power of the General Assembly in a very material sense.  
An untold number of peripheral questions and concerns now 
abound from that historic holding which will doubtlessly take 
years of work and barrels of ink to resolve.  Perhaps chief among 
them is the State’s revived immunization from suits authorized by 
statutes meant to protect the common citizen – primarily the 
AMWA (the statute at the center of Andrews)165 and the Arkansas 
Whistle-Blower’s Act (“AWBA”).166 
One of the primary concerns Justice Baker discussed in her 
dissent is that the Andrews opinion “has effectively revived the 
antiquated doctrine that ‘the king can do no wrong.’”167  By 
choosing to follow a strict interpretation of Section 20, the Court 
has suggested that it is endorsing that old doctrine.  Now, since 
the State cannot be sued for violating the AMWA, it can freely 
decide to pay its workers well below the statutory level required 
for all other employers and the State’s employees could only turn 
to the State Claims Commission for relief.168  Following the 
Court’s holding in Arkansas Community Correction v. Barnes, 
the State is similarly free to take retaliatory action against its 
whistleblowing employees without fear of sanction by the courts 
as allowed under the AWBA.169  In addition to blocking suits 
under the AWBA and AMWA, the Andrews opinion likely means 
that the State and its agencies are also now also protected from 
suits arising under freedom of information laws, suits against 
state-owned hospitals, Freedom of Information Act claims, and 
more.170 
By first allowing these suits, the legislature was obviously 
attempting to provide the citizens it represents with avenues of 
165. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 11-4-201 to -222 (Repl. 2012 & Supp. 2017); Andrews,
2018 Ark. 12, at 1, 535 S.W.3d at 617. 
166. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 21-1-601 to -610 (Repl. 2016); Andrews, 2018 Ark. 12, at 
1, 535 S.W.3d at 617.  
167. Andrews, 2018 Ark. 12, at 17-18, 535 S.W.3d at 626-27 (Baker, J., dissenting).
168. See id. at 12, 535 S.W.3d at 623.
169. Ark. Cmty. Corr. v. Barnes, 2018 Ark. 122, at 3, 542 S.W.3d 841, 843; Andrews,
2018 Ark. 12, at 18, 535 S.W.3d at 627 (Baker, J., dissenting). 
170. Andrews, 2018 Ark. 12, at 18-19, 535 S.W.3d at 626-27 (Baker, J., dissenting).
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redress other than the State Claims Commission – namely, the 
opportunity to press their claims in a court of law rather than 
apply for relief from an administrative body.171  The majority 
opinion in Andrews unquestionably strips that ability from the 
people where it was not clearly necessary to do so.  As Justice 
Baker noted in her dissent, even under the old “the king can do no 
wrong” approach, “the law has always recognized the sovereign’s 
right to submit to suit.”172  The Court has previously said that it is 
“axiomatic” that the State can consent to suit and has 
contemplated statutory waiver as consent to suit provided by the 
legislature.173  Therefore, despite the Andrews majority’s 
assertion that the AMWA’s immunity waiver is “repugnant” to 
Section 20,174 it would not have been improper to instead follow 
the view that that the State may provide its consent to suit through 
a statute.  Furthermore, considering public policy interests, it 
certainly would have been far less disruptive to our State’s legal 
status quo and would have preserved the citizen’s’ power to have 
their day in court.  The AMWA is meant to ensure hard-working 
people are paid a living wage and the AWBA is meant to allow 
employees to expose their employers’ wrongdoings without fear 
of retaliation.  The State should not be free to infringe on those 
legislatively-created protections with little fear of recourse while 
private employers are rightfully subject to judicial discipline. 
A. The Cases Following Andrews and Continued
Complications 
Subsequent to issuing its disruptive opinion in Andrews, the 
Court has handed down a number of key decisions that somewhat 
assist in understanding the Andrews holding, but which mostly 
constitute collections of various concurring and dissenting 
opinions that address issues and concerns arising out of Andrews 
and other ensuing majority opinions.175  Instead of clarifying the 
law, these cases muddy the sovereign immunity waters even 
171. Id. at 18, 535 S.W.3d at 626-27 (Baker, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 18-19, 535 S.W.3d at 627 (Baker, J., dissenting).
173. See supra Part II(A)(2).
174. Andrews, 2018 Ark. 12, at 10, 535 S.W.3d at 622.
175. See generally Ark. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs v. Mallett, 2018 Ark. 217, 549 
S.W.3d 351; Ark. Cmty. Corr. v. Barnes, 2018 Ark. 122, 542 S.W.3d 841; Walther v. FLIS 
Enters., 2018 Ark. 64, 540 S.W.3d 264. 
784 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  71:3 
further with the sharp divides that have emerged among the 
current members of the Court on this issue. 
The first of these cases to come after Andrews was Walther 
v. FLIS Enterprises, discussed previously, which was primarily
concerned with sovereign immunity’s status as an affirmative
defense.176  As noted in Section I(A), supra, the Court in FLIS
expressly held that sovereign immunity is to be treated like an
affirmative defense and that it is not a question of subject matter
jurisdiction.177  Interestingly, the issue of sovereign immunity was
not raised in the circuit court below – the Court’s analysis in FLIS
came about because it ordered supplemental briefing sua sponte
after one of the parties filed a notice that it was going to cite the
Andrews opinion.178  Since the Court found that sovereign
immunity is not a subject matter jurisdiction issue, it also stated
that it would not raise the defense for the State on its own
volition.179  Confronted with prior authority stating that sovereign
immunity is a jurisdictional issue that may or must be raised by a
court sua sponte, the Court dismissed those holdings as “dicta.”180
The concurring and dissenting opinions took issue with, among
other things, treating Section 20 immunity as a defense that may
be waived for various reasons, with their criticisms centered on
the meaning and impact of Andrews.181
The next case to follow Andrews was Arkansas Community 
Correction v. Barnes.182  As noted above, the short majority 
opinion in that case held that, in light of Andrews, the provision 
in the AWBA authorizing suits against public employers for 
violating the act was unconstitutional, just like the AMWA 
provision at issue in Andrews.183  The Court also made an attempt 
to narrow its holding, perhaps because it realized the far-reaching 
implications of its recent decisions, stating: “We emphasize here, 
as in Andrews, that the only issue before this court is whether the 
176. 2018 Ark. 64, at 3-5, 540 S.W.3d 264, 266-68.
177. Id. at 4-5, 540 S.W.3d at 267-68. 
178. Id. at 3, 540 S.W.3d at 266.
179. Id. at 5, 540 S.W.3d at 267 n.3.
180. Id. at 3-4, 540 S.W.3d at 267.
181. See FLIS, 2018 Ark. 64, at 12-14, 540 S.W.3d 264, 271-72 (Wynne, J., 
concurring); Id. at 21-24, 540 S.W.3d at 275-77 (Baker, J., dissenting); Id. at 24-25, 540 
S.W.3d at 277 (Hart, J. dissenting). 
182. 2018 Ark. 122, 542 S.W.3d 841.
183. Id. at 2-3, 542 S.W.3d at 842-43. 
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General Assembly’s choice to abrogate sovereign immunity in the 
AWBA is prohibited by the constitution. We hold that it is.”184  In 
response to this majority opinion, Justice Hart filed a relatively 
lengthy dissenting opinion that provides a solid history of 
sovereign immunity law and outlines her arguments for 
overruling Andrews.185  Ultimately, she concluded that the 
constitutional analysis in Andrews is lacking, and therefore 
flawed, and that the majority’s attempt to nominally narrow its 
holding represents walking back of the broad precedent set by 
Andrews.186 
Next came ADVA v. Mallet, wherein the Court dismissed 
another AMWA claim.187  The Court sided with the Arkansas 
Department of Veterans Affairs (“ADVA”) and dismissed the 
action against it after ADVA filed a motion to dismiss on 
sovereign immunity grounds, despite the fact that the motion first 
raising the defense came about three and a half years after the 
initial complaint was filed.188  The dissenters in Mallett made note 
of this discrepancy and raised legitimate concerns about what 
troubles this lax standard might generate.189  In her dissent, Justice 
Goodson went so far as to argue that the Mallett majority 
completely abandoned the decision in FLIS, which held that 
sovereign immunity should be treated like an affirmative 
defense.190 
While the above three cases did not alter the law on 
sovereign immunity following Andrews, discussions of the 
problems with Andrews and its consequences are pervasive 
throughout the various opinions contained in those cases.  It is 
clear from that the specter of the Andrews decision will continue 
to haunt Arkansas’s Section 20 jurisprudence for the foreseeable 
future.  Considering the sheer number of questions raised by 
Andrews, there is likely to be a considerable amount of litigation 
in the coming months and years that will hopefully yield some 
valuable answers. 
184. Id. at 3, 542 S.W.3d at 843.
185. Id. at 6-22, 542 S.W.3d at 844-52 (Hart, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 20-22, 542 S.W.3d at 851-52. 
187. 2018 Ark. 217, at 1-3, 549 S.W.3d 351, 351-52. 
188. Id. at 5, 549 S.W.3d at 353-54 (Baker, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 3-6, 549 S.W.3d at 352-54 (Baker, J., dissenting); Id. at 6-9, 549 S.W.3d at 
354-55 (Goodson, J., dissenting). 
190. Id. at 7, 549 S.W.3d at 354 (Goodson, J., dissenting).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Since the law is developing as I write, it is highly likely that 
at least some of what is contained herein will no longer be 
accurate by the time this comment reaches its readers.  As the 
Court once noted in the quote at the beginning of this comment, 
the framers knew that their inclusion of Section 20 immunity in 
our State’s constitution would result in instances of hardship, but 
they chose to include it anyway.191  Many of these hardships have 
just been discussed, while many more could not fit in these pages 
or have yet to materialize.  In light of the present issues and chaos 
surrounding our sovereign immunity law,192 it is high time that 
we question the framers’ decision to include the narrow and 
severe language of Section 20 in the state constitution.  Section 
20 has thus far served only to lock the doors of the courthouse to 
plaintiffs with genuine injuries while greatly confusing the legal 
profession in the process. 
The high degree of uncertainty in our sovereign immunity 
law is by no means necessary, but it can be resolved rather 
painlessly with a constitutional amendment.  The Arkansas 
Constitution is notoriously riddled with amendments and is fairly 
easy to change,193 so it is certainly not uncommon for us to depart 
from the framers’ original vision.  Being one of the last three 
states to retain an absolute guarantee of sovereign immunity, 
Arkansas is behind the modern trend of granting the legislature 
the power to determine the extent of the State’s immunity.194  
Such an arrangement in Arkansas would alleviate much of the 
current burden on lawyers attempting to decipher the Court’s 
holdings while also opening up the court system and making the 
State more accountable to its people. 
For some, however, granting the General Assembly the 
power to determine the State’s immunity from suit is not an 
191. See supra text accompanying note 1.
192. Particularly the problems most recently presented by the issuance of Andrews.
See supra Part III. 
193. See Steve Sheppard, Intelligible, Honest, and Impartial Democracy: Making
Laws at the Arkansas Ballot Box, or Why Jim Hannah and Ray Thornton Were Right About 
May v. Daniels, 2005 ARK. L. NOTES 123, 124. 
194. See supra Part I. 
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acceptable solution.  Professor Joshua Silverstein has developed 
a proposal that would amend Section 20 to ensure the State could 
be sued in her courts like any other private party.195  Professor 
Silverstein sees the entire concept of sovereign immunity as a 
holdover from monarchical rule that is incompatible with the 
values of a constitutional republic.196  One such example of this 
incompatibility that he points to is the fact that Arkansas has no 
judicial tribunal to review the State Claims Commission’s 
decisions akin to the Court of Federal Claims197 – a concern not 
unrecognized by at least some on the Arkansas Supreme Court.198 
Professor Silverstein’s proposal would undeniably open the 
courts and increase State accountability much more than giving 
control to the legislature, which would surely tinge the breadth of 
the State’s immunity with political motivations that may not be in 
the best interest of the general public.  More troubling still, the 
legislature could just re-enact Section 20 word-for-word as a 
statute. 
After decades of opinions struggling to interpret Section 20, 
it is painfully obvious that any attempt by the Court to resolve the 
current problems in the law would be a palliative at best.199  
Perhaps recognizing this fact and feeling pressure following 
Andrews, Chief Justice Kemp filed a two sentence concurring 
opinion in Mallett flatly saying, “I write separately to state that 
the people of Arkansas have the ability by constitutional 
amendment to decide the rights and privileges granted in their 
fundamental document.”200  Whether an amendment is placed on 
the ballot by the General Assembly or earns a spot through a 
private petition effort, the constitutional provision itself must 
change to truly rectify the situation.  Until that day comes, 
however, Arkansas lawyers will continue to wrestle with the 
195. Telephone Interview with Joshua M. Silverstein, Professor of Law, William H. 
Bowen School of Law (Sept. 4, 2018).  Proposal and interview on file with author. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. 
198. Barnes, 2018 Ark. 122, at 20, 542 S.W.3d at 851 (Hart, J., dissenting).
199. At least two current members of the Court agree: ““. . .the majority has managed
to tie into a knot the law on sovereign immunity and cannot untangle it.”  Ark. Dep’t of 
Veterans Affairs v. Mallett, 2018 Ark. 217, at 5, 549 S.W.3d 351, 353 (2018) (Baker, J., 
dissenting). 
200. ’ Id. at 3, 549 S.W.3d at  352 (Kemp, C.J., concurring).
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Court’s tangled and irregular opinions that this comment has 
hopefully made more coherent. 
ROBERT C. DALBY 
